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Abstract
We present an implementation of the eventually perfect failure detector (♦P ) from the original hierar-
chy of the Chandra-Toueg [4] oracles on an arbitrary partitionable network composed of unreliable chan-
nels that can lose and reorder messages. Prior implementations of ♦P have assumed different partially
synchronous models ranging from bounded point-to-point message delay and reliable communication to
unbounded message size and known network topologies. We implement ♦P under very weak assump-
tions on an arbitrary, partitionable network composed of Average Delayed/Dropped (ADD) channels [13]
to model unreliable communication. Unlike older implementations, our failure detection algorithm uses
bounded-sized messages to eventually detect all nodes that are unreachable (crashed or disconnected)
from it.
1 Introduction
Failure detectors were proposed by Chandra and Toueg [4] as oracles to be used to identify failed nodes
in a crash-prone asynchronous message-passing system. Each node has a failure detector module that can
be queried for information about which nodes in the system have crashed. Unreliable failure detectors can
give wrong information by incorrectly suspecting correct nodes, and/or not suspecting crashed nodes. In
spite of that, many oracles are powerful enough to solve important distributed problems that are otherwise
unsolvable in asynchronous systems with even one crash failure. The hierarchy of the Chandra-Toueg or-
acles [4] was originally introduced to circumvent the FLP [7] impossibility result for solving consensus in
a crash-prone asynchronous message-passing system, by identifying crashed nodes and distinguishing them
from slow nodes. These failure detectors can be described by their accuracy and completeness properties.
Their implementation in practice requires some degree of partial or even full synchrony. Paper [9] provides a
very informative survey on the failure detector abstraction both as building blocks for the design of reliable
distributed algorithms and as computability benchmarks.
There are two main lines of research in the area of failure detectors. The first one involves implementing
failure detectors on increasingly weaker system models that represent practical applications and the second
one involves finding the weakest failure detector for solving a given problem. We contribute to the first line
of research by presenting a novel implementation of an eventually perfect failure detector (♦P ) from the
original Chandra-Toueg hierarchy on an arbitrary partitionable network of unknown topology composed of
ill-behaved channels.
In [1], the definitions of accuracy and completeness for failure detectors were extended to partitionable
networks. ♦P for partitionable networks satisfies strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy. Intu-
itively, ♦P can give incorrect information about the nodes in the system for an unknown finite amount of
time, after which, it provides perfect information about all nodes in the system. Strong completeness is
satisfied if the failure detector of each node eventually suspects all nodes that are unreachable (i.e., crashed
or disconnected) from it. Eventual strong accuracy is satisfied if the failure detector of every node eventually
stops suspecting all nodes that are reachable from it. The paper by Chen et al. [6] studies accuracy and
completeness properties (quality of service) of failure detectors and quantifies how fast different implementa-
tions of oracles detect failures and how well they avoid false suspicions. Papers [12] and [10] have discussed
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algorithms to perform failure detection on arbitrary networks composed of unreliable channels using coun-
ters as heartbeats for the nodes in the system. Unlike our algorithm, the message sizes in their algorithms
are unbounded. Papers [8] and [3] do failure detection using bounded sized messages, but unlike our work,
they assume that the underlying communication channels are reliable. Our contribution in this paper is a
little of both. We present a novel algorithm that implements ♦P in an arbitrary (partitionable) network
composed of channels that provide very weak guarantees (unreliable channels), using messages that are
bounded in size.
The framework of ADD (Average Delayed/Dropped) channels was introduced by Sastry and Pike [13]
who exploited the channel properties to implement ♦P on cliques; the properties of an ADD channel are
valid only for one-hop networks. The motivation for this paper was based on extending the failure detector
from a fully connected network of ADD channels to any arbitrary partitionable network composed of ADD
channels using bounded size messages. The ADD channels are a realistic partially synchronous model of
ill-behaved channels that can lose and reorder messages.
Our failure detection algorithm uses bounded sized heartbeats, timeouts and path information to deter-
mine if there is a correct path (all nodes on this path are correct) between two nodes. Periodically, every
node sends out its own heartbeat to its neighbors. Every node has an estimated timeout value for its neigh-
bors and if a node does not hear from its neighbor within this estimated time, it suspects the neighbor to
be crashed. The timeout value gets incremented every time a neighbor is incorrectly suspected. For a node
that is not a neighbor, the algorithm goes through a list of paths from itself to the node and evaluates if the
node is reachable via at least one of these paths (i.e., all nodes on a path are correct according to the failure
detector). If no such path exists, it suspects this node.
2 Model and Definitions
2.1 Communication Model
We are considering the original definition [13] of the Average Delayed/Dropped (ADD) channel in which
every link connecting two nodes in the network is composed of two unidirectional ADD channels, one in
each direction. All messages sent on an ADD channel are eventually delivered or lost but not duplicated.
The messages can be partitioned logically into two disjoint sets: privileged and unprivileged. Unprivileged
messages have no timing or reliability guarantees and may be arbitrarily delayed or even dropped. However,
an ADD channel provides the following guarantee for privileged messages. For every ADD channel there is
an unknown upper bound d on the delay of all privileged messages and a unknown upper bound r on the
number of unprivileged messages sent between any consecutive pair of privileged messages. Intuitively this
means that out of r consecutive messages sent on an ADD channel at least one message is guaranteed to be
delivered within d time.
2.2 Network Model
The distributed system consists of a set Π of n nodes connected in an arbitrary topology by ADD channels.
Nodes may fail only by crashing. Nodes that never crash are called correct nodes and those that have not
crashed yet are called live nodes. Each node that crashes remains crashed forever. Each node knows who
its neighbors are. Nodes also know the names (ids) of all the nodes in the system. This assumption is not
trivial, as Jimenez et al. [11] show that without this assumption, no failure detector can be implemented,
even in a fully synchronous system with reliable links.
Nodes communicate with neighbors only via local point-to-point communication. Each node has a local
clock which generates ticks at a constant rate. Different clocks can tick at different rates and can be
unsynchronized. The network is initially a connected graph but may eventually be partitioned as nodes start
crashing. We call this network a partitionable network.
Definition 1. The network graph at time t is a subgraph of the initial graph obtained by deleting all nodes
(and their incident links) that are crashed at time t.
We denote the network graph at time t as G(t).
2
3 Problem Statement
We address the problem of implementing, with bounded-sized messages, an Eventually Perfect (♦P ) failure
detector that satisfies the following on an arbitrary partitionable network G composed of ADD channels.
For each node p, there is a function from p’s state to the set of nodes that p suspects. In every execution
there exists a time tf such that for every t > tf and every correct node p,
• Strong Completeness: for every node q that is disconnected from p in G(t), p suspects q at time t
• Eventual strong accuracy: for every node q that is connected to p in G(t), p does not suspect q at time
t.
4 ♦P Algorithm
Algorithm 1 ♦P: Eventually Perfect Failure Detector, Code for node p
Constants:
1: neighbors // list of neighbors of p.
2: T // integer; time between successive heartbeats
Variables:
3: clock() // local clock
4: last contact[.] // array of clock times for all neighbors,
last time p received a message about that node; initially
last contact[q] = 0, for all q ∈ neighbors
5: suspect local[·] // array of booleans for all nodes; initially
suspect local[q] = false, for all q ∈ Π. This stores the
failure information for nodes in p’s connected component
6: paths[·] // Array of sets of paths or sequences of node
ids. paths[q] is the set of paths taken by the heart-
beat messages from q to p; Initially paths[p] = {p},
paths[q] = {q · p} for q ∈ neighbors and paths[r] = Ø
for all others
7: suspect[·] // array of booleans for all nodes; it is true
for all nodes suspected to have failed; initially suspect[q]
= false, for all q ∈ Π. This stores the failure informa-
tion stored in suspect local[·] and also information derived
from the paths[·] variable
8: timeout[·] // Array of time-outs for all neighbors.
timeout[q] is the estimated maximum time between the
receipt of successive messages about neighbor q; initially
timeout[q] = T , for all q ∈ neighbors
9: 〈 output Send heartbeat to neighbors 〉:
10: precondition:
11: clock() = n·T for n ∈ N // clock() is an integer multiple
of T
12: end precondition
13: effect:
14: send〈suspect local[·], paths[·], p〉 to every neighbor of p
// Send heartbeat with a copy of the local suspect list and
the path list
15: end effect
16: 〈 input recv〈suspect rcv[·], path sets[·], q〉 〉:
17: effect:
18: if suspect local[q] = true then // neighbor wrongfully
suspected
19: timeout[q] := 2 · (clock()− last contact[q])
20: suspect local[q] := false// Stop suspecting this
neighbor
21: end if
22: last contact[q] := clock()
23: for all r /∈ neighbors do
24: hop from msg := Length of the shortest path in
path sets[r] not containing p or a node u, u 6= r with
suspect rcv[u] = true
25: hop := Length of the shortest path in paths[r] not
containing a node u, u 6= r with suspect local[u] = true
26: if hop from msg < hop then
27: suspect local[r] := suspect rcv[r]
28: end if
29: for each path, pi ∈ path sets[r] that does not contain
p do
30: paths[r] := paths[r]∪{pi · p} // Append new paths
to the paths[r] set
31: end for
32: end for
33: suspect[·] := suspect local[·]
34: Let Sus be the set of all u with suspect local[u] = true
35: for all r /∈ neighbors do
36: if all paths in paths[r] contain a u ∈ Sus and u 6= r
then
37: suspect[r] := true
38: end if
39: end for
40: end effect
41: 〈 output timer expiry(q) 〉: // The timer for a neighbor
expires
42: precondition:
43: timeout[q] = clock()− last contact[q]
44: end precondition
45: effect:
46: suspect local[q] := true
47: end effect
Algorithm 1 implements ♦P over the partitionable network of ADD channels. Every node p maintains
a variable suspect local[·] which is an array of booleans to store information about nodes in p’s connected
component and a variable paths[·] which is an array of paths (sequences of node ids). For example, the
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variable paths[q] stores the paths between p and q that p has learned about from messages from its neighbors.
Node p also maintains an array of booleans suspect[·] which stores failure information from suspect local[·]
along with extra information derived from paths[·]. Its value is set to true for nodes estimated to have
crashed (using failure information from suspect local[·]) or nodes that are estimated to be disconnected from
p (using information from paths[·]). If p’s suspect[q] variable is true, then we say p suspects q.
Node p sends out a heartbeat message containing the variables suspect local[·] and paths[·] to its neighbors
every T units of time. T may be chosen differently by every node. The smaller the value of T , the faster
the failure detection algorithm will converge, but if T is too small, the network may be over crowded with
heartbeat messages. When p receives a heartbeat message from a neighbor q, it records its current clock
time (clock()) as the last contact value. If q was wrongly suspected as the timeout[q] value was estimated to
be too small, p stops suspecting q by setting suspect local[q] to false and increments its timeout[q] value for
q. Then, p extracts information about the rest of the network from the message from q. For all nodes r that
are not neighbors of p, p calculates q’s distance from r and compares it to its own calculated distance from
r. If q is calculated to be nearer to r than p, then p adopts q’s information about r. Node p goes through
all the paths in the variable path sets[·] received in the message from q and sees if p is already included in
those paths. If p learns about any path pi, from r to q that does not include p, it adds the path pi · p to its
paths[r] set.
Then, p updates its suspect[·] variables using information from the paths[·] variable about nodes that
are not in p’s connected component. As there are no paths from these nodes to p, information about these
nodes is not received directly. Node p checks if at least one path in the paths[r] set has all nodes that have
suspect local[·] set to false. If not, it suspects r (i.e., suspect[r] is set to true ).
5 Proof of Correctness
To prove correctness, we need to show that the implementation in Algorithm 1 satisfies strong complete-
ness and eventual strong accuracy. We describe some lemmas to prove that Algorithm 1 implements
♦P .
Lemma 1 shows that there is an upper bound on the inter-arrival time of heartbeats at all correct nodes
from correct neighbors. Lemma 2 shows that eventually, the time-out estimates for neighbors stop changing.
Lemmas 3 and 4 show that eventually all correct nodes suspect crashed neighbors and stop suspecting
correct neighbors. Lemma 5 shows that eventually the paths[q] variable at a correct node p contains all the
paths between p and q in the final network graph. Lemma 6, along with Theorem 1, proves eventual strong
accuracy. Theorem 2 proves strong completeness. Finally, Theorem 3 shows that Algorithm 1 implements
♦P using Theorems 1 and 2.
We use a subscript to denote which node a variable belongs to; for example p’s suspect local[q] variable
will be denoted as suspect localp[q]. From here on we refer to nodes that are neighbors with respect to the
initial network graph as initial neighbors.
Lemma 1. There exists an upper bound on the inter-arrival time of heartbeats for correct initial neighbors.
Proof. The properties of an ADD channel guarantee that at least one in every r messages sent on a channel
is privileged and thus is delivered within d time. Thus the maximum time between the receipt of two
consecutive heartbeat messages sent on Line 14 of Algorithm 1 at any neighbor q of p is (r+ 1) ·T + d where
r and d are the ADD channel parameters and T is a constant in p’s algorithm.
Let t∗ be the time when all the failures have occurred. Let t∗∗ ≥ t∗ be the time when all messages
(privileged and unprivileged) from all crashed nodes have been delivered or lost. We call the network graph
after t∗ the final network graph and denote it by G.
Lemma 2. Eventually, all timeout[q] variables stop changing.
Proof. Let q be an initial neighbor of p. Assume by contradiction that the timeoutp[q] variable at node p
keeps changing forever.
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If q is a correct node, this would mean that the inter-arrival times of messages from q to p keeps increasing
and so does the timeoutp[q] value. But by Lemma 1, there is an upper bound on this value. Thus our
assumption that timeoutp[q] changes forever was false.
If q is a crashed node, the number of messages sent to p by q is finite and they are eventually delivered
to p or lost. The timeoutp[q] value may keep on increasing till t
∗∗. After this, p never receives a message
from q and the thus timeoutp[q] stops changing after this. Thus our assumption that timeoutp[q] changes
forever was false.
Observation 1. For a correct node p, the suspectp[q] variable for an initial neighbor q is equal to suspect localp[q]
at all times.
Lemma 3. There exists some time t after which all correct initial neighbors p of a crashed node q in G
suspect q.
Proof. Let us assume that q crashes at time tc. From lines 20 and 41 - 46 of Algorithm 1 we know
that the suspect local[·] variables for initial neighbors are set only by the nodes themselves (i.e., nodes do
not update information about their initial neighbors from other nodes). From Lemma 2, we know that
by some time tf , the variable timeoutp[q] stops changing. So, by time t = (max (t
f , t∗∗) + timeoutp[q]), p
sets suspect localp[q] to true permanently. By Observation 1, we know that suspectp[q] = suspect localp[q].
Thus after t, p suspects q.
Lemma 4. There exists some time t after which all correct initial neighbors p of a correct node q stop
suspecting q.
Proof. Lemma 1 states that there is an upper bound on the inter-arrival time of messages from q to p.
Lemma 2 states that timeoutp[q] eventually stops changing. Let the time at which timeoutp[q] stops changing
be t and the final value of timeoutp[q] be τ . Thus after t, p receives a message from q within every τ time and
thus, p never sets suspect localp[q] to true. By Observation 1, we know that suspectp[q] = suspect localp[q],
thus after t, p stops suspecting q.
Lemma 5. For all p and q such that q is not an initial neighbor of p, eventually the pathsp[q] variable
contains all the paths in G from q to p and pathsp[q] stops changing.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a path pi in G that is never included in pathsp[q] variable at p. Let
the length of this path be k and the nodes in this path be q ·q1 ·q2 · · · · ·qk−1 ·p. From Lemma 1, we know that
each node in this path receives a message from the previous node in this path infinitely often as all nodes in
this path are correct. From line number 30, we know that each of these paths is appended to the pathsp[qi]
variable of each node qi /∈ neighborsp. So, when p gets a message from qk−1 with the path q · q1 · q2 · · · · · qk−1
in it, it adds the path q · q1 · q2 · · · · · qk−1 · p to its pathsp[q] variable.
Note that all pathsp[q] end with p. After pathsp[q] contains all the paths between q and p in G, if p
learns about a new path from q to p, it must be a cycle with p in it already. Line number 29 checks if p is
in the path already and if this is true, p ignores it. Thus the value of pathsp[q] stops changing once it learns
about all paths between q and p in G.
A node p has perfect information about node q at time t > t∗, if any one of the following hold:
• If q is in p’s connected component in G, suspectp[q] = false at t.
• If q is crashed and is an initial neighbor of p’s connected component C in G, suspect localp[q] = true
at t (This is because suspect localp stores information about C and its crashed initial neighbors). Note
that if suspect localp[q] is true, then line numbers 33 to 39 imply that suspectp[q] is set to true as
well.
• If q is not in p’s connected component in G, suspectp[q] = true at t.
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Lemma 6. For all k, there exists a time tk such that, for all t ≥ tk, all correct nodes p in a connected
component C in G, have perfect information about all nodes q that are either correct and in C or are crashed
and are initial neighbors of C, at a distance at most k from p in G.
Proof. We prove this lemma by strong induction on the distance k of node p from q in G. Base case: k = 1.
From Lemmas 3 and 4, we know that there exists a time when all correct initial neighbors have perfect
information about q.
Inductive hypothesis: Let us assume that all nodes that are at most k−1 hops away from q in G have perfect
information about q after some time tk−1.
Inductive step: Let p be a node at a distance k from q in G. If q is correct, there exists a path q ·pi · p from q
to p (since p, q ∈ C). If q is crashed, there exists a path pi · p from an initial neighbor of q to p (since q is an
initial neighbor of C). Let r be a node on this path k− 1 hops away from q (note, r is an initial neighbor of
p). From the inductive hypothesis we know that r has perfect information about q after time tk−1. Before
time tk−1, r sent only a finite number of messages to p. Let t† be the time when all messages sent before
tk−1 are either delivered to p or lost. All messages that r sends to p after time tk−1 have perfect information
about q in them.
From Lemma 1, we know that there is an upper bound on the time between two consecutive receive events
from r to p. Let this upper bound be τ . By Lemma 5, after some time ta, all paths from q to r in G are
appended to pathsr[q] and sent to p in the variable path sets[q]. So, after time t
′ = (max{tk−1, t†, ta}+ 2τ),
all messages p gets from r have perfect information about q and contain all paths between q and r (in G).
When p processes a message from r after t′ we argue that the value of hop from msg for q on line
number 24 is k − 1. hop from msg cannot be greater than k − 1 because the variable path sets[q] contains
q ·pi which is of length k−1. Also, hop from msg cannot be less than k−1 because r has perfect information
about all nodes at a distance k − 1 from r, and so, the estimate for hop from msg will discard all paths
with length less than k− 1 as they are no more available in G. We also argue that the value of hop for q on
line number 25 is greater than k− 1. This is because, by the inductive hypothesis, p has perfect information
about nodes that are k− 1 hops away from p in G. So, all entries in pathsp[r] with length at most k− 1 are
discarded as they are correctly estimated to have a at least one crashed node in them. Thus, the value of
hop for q is greater than k− 1. As a result, the ‘if’ condition on line number 26 is satisfied and p adopts r’s
information about q. By the inductive hypothesis, this information is perfect (note that p adopts only r’s
suspect localr[q] variable which currently contains perfect information about q).
We still have to show that p’s suspectp[q] variable does not get set to something different (from the one
set by the message from r) by a message coming from a node with wrong information about q. Let us assume
that by contradiction, p gets a message from a node s that is at a distance i > k from q and the value of
hop from msg for q on line number 24 is miscalculated to be at most k− 1. This scenario is possible only if
there is a path pi′ in pathss[q] with |pi′| ≤ k− 1 that is wrongly assumed to exist in G. However, since s is at
a distance i greater than k from q in G, pi′ must have a crashed node in it. Let z ∈ pi′ be the crashed node
that s has wrong information about. Since z is less than k hops away from s, by the induction hypothesis, s
already has perfect information about z. Thus the assumption that the value of hop from msg for q on line
number 24 is calculated to be at most k − 1 is incorrect and p permanently possesses perfect information
about q.
Theorem 1 proves eventual strong accuracy and Theorem 2 proves strong completeness.
Theorem 1. Eventually, two correct nodes p and q in the same connected component of G stop suspecting
each other.
Proof. The proof is direct from Lemma 6.
Observation 2. Let C be a connected component in G. Let q be a node in Π−C. For every path pi between
p ∈ C and q in the original network graph, there exists a node r such that r is a crashed initial neighbor of
C.
Theorem 2. Every correct node eventually suspects all nodes that are not in its connected component in G.
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Proof. Let C be a connected component in G. We show that all p ∈ C eventually suspect all q ∈ Π − C.
Since originally the network was a connected graph, there was a path from all q to p in the initial network
graph. We separate this proof into two parts:
• q is an initial neighbor of p. In this case, the proof is direct from Lemma 3.
• q is not an initial neighbor of p. Let pi be a path in pathsp[q]. From Observation 2, we know that all
paths from q to p have a crashed node r that is an initial neighbor of a node in C. From Lemma 6, we
know that after some time t, p has perfect information about r. Thus, all pi ∈ pathsp[q] have a node r
that has suspect localp[r] = true. When p calculates the suspect variable for q on line numbers 33 to
39, the if condition on line number 36 is satisfied and suspectp[q] is set to true on line number 37.
Now we show that this value of the suspect variable is not reversed. Since from Lemma 5, we know
that pathsp[q] stops changing and the information about all nodes r is never reversed, we can safely
conclude that line number 36 is always satisfied henceforth and suspectp[q] always remains true.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 implements an eventually perfect failure detector for partitionable networks using
bounded size messages.
Proof. This proof is direct from Theorems 1 and 2 which prove eventual strong accuracy and strong com-
pleteness respectively.
The messages sent by a node p ∈ Π have the variables suspect local[·] and paths[·] in them. Note that
both these variables are bounded in size. The suspect local[·] variable has n booleans and so has size n bits.
The paths[·] variable contains only simple paths between nodes which can be at most O(n · n!) bits (in the
case of a complete graph) and so has message size at most O((n+ 1)!) bits. Thus, the messages used in this
algorithm are bounded in size.
6 Conclusion
We have implemented the eventually perfect failure detector (♦P ) in a weak, arbitrary, partitionable net-
work model composed of unreliable, partially synchronous ADD channel with unbounded message loss and
unbounded message delay for a majority of the messages. This work is an important step towards under-
standing the minimal assumptions on network topology, message sizes, reliability of channels and partial
synchrony necessary to implement this oracle. The algorithm is quite practical for sparsely connected graphs
as the number of paths between two nodes (and the message size) will be  (n + 1)!. Even though the
message size for this algorithm is bounded, can we do better than our current results using smaller messages
or fewer messages? We think that these are important questions that need to be answered in the future.
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